The Best and the Brightest. David Halberstam.

The Best and the Brightest
David Halberstam
New York: Random House
1972

Why read it? Fascinating study of the diffrences in the behavior of presidential advisers under two different styles of leadership--JFK and LBJ. These differences in leadership changed American history. Same presidential advisers--McNamara, Rusk, etc.--but different styles of presidential leadership. JFK welcomed all points of view on issues. In the end he made the decision whether his advisers agreed or not. LBJ made decisions by consensus. "Let's vote." The consensus became the decision.

Some sample ideas:
66. "...it would be said of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson that both had their Bay of Pigs, that the former's lasted four days and the latter's lasted four years (Vietnam)." 69. Bowles: "The question which concerns me about the new [Kennedy] administration is whether it lacks a genuine sense of conviction about what is right and what is wrong.... ...adds up the plusses and minuses of any question and comes up with a conclusion...the pragmatic approach." 75. "[Harriman] had tuaght all his proteges always to be brief when talking to a president; they have so little time; everyone is always telling them things. Keep it short and simple, and brevity above all...one idea, a few brief sentences."

91. "Harriman...knowing the importance of repetition within a government, he had started repeating a litany whenever he could at Washington meetings, at dinner parties...." 102. [About the President]: "There was too little time to plan, to think; one could only confront the most immediate problems and get rid of them piecemeal, but as quickly as possible, or at least postpone any action." 121. "The essence of good foreign policy is constant re-examination." 170. The American assumption...that the government and the people of South Vietnam were as one, that what Diem wanted was what the 'people' wanted."

184. "For Stilwell it did not matter whether the news was good or bad; the worse the news, the more you needed it." 212. "In government it is always easier to go forward with a program that does not work than to stop it altogether and admit failure." 234. "McNamara's power was facts, no one had more, and no one used them better, firing them out, one after another, devastating his opponents (though sometimes his friends would feel that there was a missing piece, that sometimes this brilliant reasoning was bsed...on a false assumption.)." 256. "Both at Ford and at the Pentagon, McNamara had always loved statistics and facts, particularly those which confimred what he wanted to prove."

Quote: 282. "Kennedy was by this tme very frustrated; he told aides that he could not believe a word that the military was telling him, that he had to read the newspapers to find out what was going on."

Quote: 665. "...a fully confident Pham Van Dong...told Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times in December 1966 in Hanoi: 'And how long do you Americans want to fight, Mr. Salsbury...one year? Two years? Three years? Five years? Ten years? Twenty years? We will be glad to accommodate you.' "

Quote: 638. "The body count in Chau Doc is marvelous!"